Two courts have been reviewing the US blacklisting of Anthropic. A judge in US District Court for the Northern District of California ruled last month that the action was illegal because Anthropic does not meet the definition of a supply-chain risk, which is limited to “the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert… a covered system.”
Today’s ruling from the DC Circuit did not dispute the district court’s primary finding. But it said the district court was tasked with reviewing whether the decision was allowed under one law while the appeals court has exclusive jurisdiction to review the decision under a different, more permissive grant of authority.
The district court decision found a violation of 10 U.S.C. § 3252, in which supply chain risks are limited to malicious actions by adversaries. The appeals court reviewed the blacklisting under 41 U.S.C. § 4713, which doesn’t have the same restrictions. Notably, Congress gave the DC Circuit appeals court exclusive jurisdiction to review procurement actions taken under Section 4713 designations.
Bad motive not required
Today’s ruling said:
We have no quarrel with the Northern District’s conclusion that use of the critical noun adversary, combined with the sinister connotation fairly pervading the string of sabotage, maliciously introduce, and otherwise subvert, indicate that bad motive is required to support a designation under section 3252. Likewise, we have no quarrel with the Northern District’s conclusion that Anthropic has acted with no such bad motive in its dealings with the Department. But as explained at length above, no such bad motive is required to support a designation under the much broader definition set forth in section 4713.
The US designated Anthropic as a supply chain risk under both 3252 and 4713. The latter statute defines “supply chain risk” as “the risk that any person may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, extract data, or otherwise manipulate the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, maintenance, disposition, or retirement” of covered technology products “so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise manipulate the function, use, or operation of” those products or the information stored or transmitted on them, the court said.









English (US) ·