Akira ransomware scum blocked victim's security tools – and broke their own encryptor

Security

Gives a whole new meaning to Safe Mode

An Akira ransomware affiliate rebooted a victim’s computer into Safe Mode to kill its security tools – and in the process sabotaged their own malware when the limited-function startup mode also broke their encryptor.

But the ending wasn't entirely happy for the victim. The attacker had already stolen credentials and data from file shares before Safe Mode prevented the ransomware from doing its job. 

Huntress security operations analyst James Northey detailed the incident in a Wednesday blog and cautioned that this was more likely a memory-configuration issue, and shouldn't be taken as a practical defense to prevent Akira ransomware from locking up valuable files. 

“Ultimately this could be a case of winning the battle, but not the war,” Northey said on Wednesday in a blog shared with The Register.

“It’s possible that a host with more physical memory or a larger page file might give akira.exe enough virtual memory to encrypt the endpoint in Safe Mode,” Northey added. “Akira’s developers or affiliates could retool the encryptor to reduce its memory demands or make its Safe Mode launch sequence more reliable, meaning that the same failure may not occur in a future intrusion.”

Nonetheless, there's one big lesson here: For the love of all that is holy, turn on multi-factor authentication (MFA).

Here’s a closer look at what happened, and how to prevent it from happening to you.

How it started…

In early August, Huntress responded to an incident that began, as most Akira intrusions do, with a SonicWall SSL VPN. On August 4, the VPN logged a credential-spray attack: a burst of failed logins using bad credentials that it denied. But then, seven minutes later, one of them succeeded when the attacker used a valid VPN account that wasn’t protected by MFA. 

Once they had gained access, the criminal accessed the domain controller via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and queried Active Directory to hoover up detailed information about the network, users, groups, computers – essentially everything an attacker needs to know about who and what to target for lateral movement and mass encryption in a ransomware attack.

“The enumeration was a full-property dump of every user and every computer in the domain,” Northey wrote. 

The Akira ransomware affiliate then moved to the application server to start collecting stolen data, downloading WinRAR and using that tool to archive mapped file shares before sending the stolen data to cloud storage using s5cmd, a fast S3 transfer utility.

They also installed remote desktop software AnyDesk, configured to start with Windows, and abused this legitimate tool as a remote-access trojan, giving the attacker hands-on keyboard control. They also used it as a command-and-control channel to drop more malware, including the very cleverly named akira.exe ransomware binary – because no one would guess what that executable could be, right?

Then came the Safe Mode reboot

Here’s where things went sideways for the ransomware scumbag. About three hours into the intrusion, the attacker forced the computer to reboot into Safe Mode with Networking, a boot mode that only loads essential drivers and services, blocking most third-party software. 

Attackers, especially ransomware gangs, do this to disable endpoint detection and response products and other security tools that would otherwise detect and stop their malware from infecting victims’ machines. While some ransomware crews, including Snatch and AvosLocker, have abused Safe Mode for this purpose for years, Huntress has never seen Akira do it until now.

In this case, the reboot stopped the Huntress agent and disabled Microsoft Defender's real-time protection, preventing Defender from quarantining the malicious file.

“The attacker got their blind window,” Northey wrote. “What they didn't get was a clean detonation.”

Thirteen seconds after the reboot, the computer started spewing memory errors. Safe Mode boots with constrained virtual memory, and it didn’t have sufficient memory to encrypt the endpoint. Essentially, Safe Mode not only acted as an EDR killer, but also borked the ransomware.

In addition to the obvious recommendations – like make sure you receive alerts on bursts of failed VPN logins against multiple usernames from one source, and require MFA on every VPN account – Huntress suggests organizations keep an eye out for this Safe Mode play.

Specifically, “alert on boot-configuration changes and Safe Mode boots: msconfig.exe / bcdedit activity, Kernel-Boot EID 27 with a SAFEBOOT load option, Kernel-General EID 12 BootMode=2, and third-party security services stopping (System EID 7036),” Northey wrote.

Also, “watch for tooling being added to the Safe Mode minimal-service registry list.” ®